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Federal Statutory Requirements for

Accommodating Handicapped Students in
School Choice Programs
Theresa E. Cudahyt
Milton Friedman first proposed school tuition vouchers in
1955, arguing that schools would qualitatively improve if they were
required to compete for students and funding.' In the 35 years
since Friedman's initial proposal, many commentators have agreed
that competitive systems could remedy the shortcomings of public
schools.2 These scholars have suggested that competition for funding would provide incentives for schools to improve the educational benefits they offer. Under the current regime, most schools
receive public funds regardless of the quality of education they offer. Vouchers, or school choice programs, attempt to impose market forces on the education system so that the best and most efficient schools will prevail.
Selective school choice programs entail students applying for
admission, and schools selecting from the applicant pool.' Students
not selected by schools of their choice either attend less desirable
participating schools or schools not competing in the choice program. Competitive selection, by both schools and students, blurs
the traditional distinction between "public" and "private" schools.
t B.A. 1986, Amherst College; J.D. Candidate 1992, University of Chicago.

I Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in Robert A. Solo, ed, Economics and the Public Interest 123 (Rutgers U Press, 1955).

' See John E. Coons and Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model
State System For Vouchers, 59 Cal L Rev 321 (1971); E. S. Saves, Privatizing the Public
Sector: How to Shrink Government 102-03 (Chatham House Publishers, 1982); Thomas
Sowell, Education: Assumptions Versus History 103-06 (Hoover Institution Press, 1986);
John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools (Brookings
Inst, 1990).
8 Some existing choice programs, like the one which operated in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
for the 1990-91 school year, allow for schools' random selection of students. See Wis Stat
§ 119.23(3) (1989). The absence of competition by schools for students eliminates the disparate impact of uniform voucher programs. However, if schools randomly select applicants,
schools are not as apt to accommodate the disabled as they are when schools seek out handicapped students. Furthermore, although random selection may eliminate any disparate im-

pact of a choice program on the handicapped, in some cases it may result in handicapped

students matriculating at schools which do not have adequate funds to educate the
students.
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For a choice program to gain the benefits of competition, the
program must have broad participation, with few schools accepting
students in the traditional residence-based method. As more
schools participate, more students will participate, and greater
amounts of money will be channeled to schools which compete successfully in their markets.
Broad participation is already a reality: 35 states in the United
States provide for some form of parental choice in their children's
schools.4 However, since communities are unsure of the benefits of
educational choice, they may operate traditional public school systems in addition to choice programs, thereby creating two classes
of schools. If the schools participating in the choice program are
superior to the non-participating schools in a community, students
excluded from the choice program are forced to attend inferior
schools.
This Comment does not address the merits of school choice
programs. Instead the Comment assumes the existence of voucher
programs and discusses whether federal law requires such programs to accommodate the special needs of handicapped students.
Part I of the Comment argues that uniform tuition voucher programs place disabled students at a disadvantage compared to nondisabled students in competing for access to higher quality, selective schools. Selective schools are unlikely to accept handicapped
students who offer the same tuition as non-handicapped students,
because handicapped students impose higher costs on schools than
do the non-handicapped. 6 Thus, uniform vouchers effectively exclude handicapped students from a public program. Parts II
through IV of this Comment explain that the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act 7 ("EAHCA"), the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,1 and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")

State Education Performance Chart (US Dept of Educ, Office of Planning, Budget
and Evaluation, May 1990).
1 For example, Milwaukee's choice program is currently limited to one percent of the
student population. Wis Stat § 119.23(1)(b)(1) (1989). Note also that President Bush's 1991
school reform proposal would fund only 535 experimental schools nationwide. David
Shribman and Hilary Stout, 'Education President's' Ambitious Agenda Faces Formidable
Obstacles Nationwide, Wall Street Journal A14 (Apr 19, 1991).
' Patterns in Special Education Service, Delivery, and Cost iv (US Dept of Educ, Office of Educational Research and Improvement, Dec 1988).
' 20 USC §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
a 29 USC §§ 701-96 (1988).
Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990).

'
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prohibit the uniform voucher system's exclusionary effects on
handicapped students. °
This Comment argues that a calibrated voucher system that
accounts for the additional expense of educating the handicapped
complies with federal law without imposing additional costs on the
public. A calibrated voucher system awards more money to handicapped students relative to other students, providing schools with
an incentive to accept disabled students and to develop programs
designed to meet their needs, while also providing sufficient funds
to educate them.

I.

SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS

This Comment offers a solution to alleviate the detrimental
effect that uniform voucher programs have on the participation of
handicapped students in choice programs. In a program with uniform vouchers, each participating student is allocated the same
amount of money, regardless of the individual costs of educating
the students. Conversely, calibrated voucher programs can better
accommodate the needs of disabled students by allocating more
money to them.
A.

Uniform Vouchers

Uniform voucher programs have a disparate impact on the
handicapped because they do not provide selective schools financial incentive to accept handicapped students. Concededly, choice
programs that provide uniform vouchers do not explicitly exclude
the handicapped. Rather, the programs are neutral on their face,
offering identical tuition credit to any participating student, regardless of whether the student is handicapped or requires additional care.
This facially neutral treatment, however, produces an inequitable result. Vouchers which cover all or most of the cost of educating non-handicapped students do not suffice for handicapped
students. In 1985-86, public education of handicapped students
'o Handicapped students do not have a strong federal equal protection claim against
uniform vouchers. The Supreme Court has held that education is not a fundamental constitutional right, and that the handicapped do not qualify under the Court's standard for a
"suspect class." See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 37 (1973)
(education is not a fundamental right afforded explicit or implicit protection under the Constitution); City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 439-47 (1985) (mental
retardation is not a "quasi-suspect" classification justifying an intermediate level of
scrutiny).
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cost an average of $6,335 per pupil, while educating non-handicapped children cost an average of only $2,780.11 Thus, while a
voucher of $3,000 does not even cover half the cost of educating a
disabled student, the same voucher provides more than enough
funding to educate a non-handicapped student.
Because uniform vouchers fail to compensate schools sufficiently for educating the handicapped, schools have no financial
incentive to accept handicapped students. The uniform voucher
program thus has a disparate impact on the handicapped: unable
to finance the costs of their education in full, handicapped students are unable to participate.

B. Calibrated Vouchers
If public programs are prohibited by law from excluding the
handicapped, calibrated vouchers are one method of preventing de
facto discrimination in a voucher system. Since education for the
handicapped costs roughly two and one-third times more per pupil
than education for the non-handicapped, 2 a voucher that provides
two and one-third times more funding for the handicapped student
enables that child to participate. States which comply with the
EAHCA receive federal money to educate handicapped students.'"
EAHCA funding is determined independently of whether states
enact voucher programs. The calibrated voucher program merely
reallocates how the federal funds are spent, without costing states
more than would uniform voucher programs. 14 Even if states were
not required by law to consider the needs of the handicapped when
formulating school choice programs, calibrated vouchers are a sensible solution.

Patterns in Special Education at iv (cited in note 6).
"

Id.

10

See part II of this Comment.

1, Other writers have proposed calibrated vouchers. See Chubb & Moe, Politics, Markets, and America's Schools at 220 (cited in note 2) for a suggestion that states calibrate
vouchers for a variety of special needs, including disability and poverty. See also Editorial,
School Choice, Without Harm, NY Times, 4-16 (Apr 28, 1991) for an editorial suggesting
that President Bush's school choice proposal should "[attach] enough money to each student so that better schools would want to compete for even the dullest and most poorly

behaved."
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II.

THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT OF

1975
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975" is
Congress's explicit remedy for discrimination against the handicapped in education. The statute provides financial assistance to
states if they make available to their handicapped students a "free
' Congress enacted the EAHCA
appropriate public education."16
amidst a wave of judicial decisions and state legislation recognizing
the rights of handicapped persons. At the time the EAHCA was
enacted, two federal district court decisions had established a right
to public education for handicapped children,' 7 and many state
courts had reached similar results.' s
The EAHCA mandates that handicapped children receive an
"appropriate" education 9 and that they be "mainstreamed" to the
greatest extent practicable.20 Given the statutory requirement for
an "appropriate" education in a "mainstream" environment, two
arguments emerge for requiring states to provide the disabled
meaningful access to educational choice programs. First, states
that implement choice programs may not meet the "appropriate"
education standard under the EAHCA if these programs effectively
exclude disabled students from participating. Second, although a
choice program might not remove handicapped children from
mainstream classrooms, if the program causes the flight of nondisabled students from certain schools, then it effectively excludes
handicapped students from the new "mainstream." Thus, disabled
students conceivably could base a claim on both the requirement
that states must provide an "appropriate" education for them, and
on the requirement that states make reasonable efforts to "main"
10

20 USC §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
20 USC § 1412(1).

17 Mills v Board of Educ., 348 F Supp 866 (D DC 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v Pennsylvania, 334 F Supp 1257 (E D Pa 1971), modified 343 F
Supp 279 (E D Pa 1972).

"* Education for All Handicapped Children Act, S Rep No 168, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 6-7
(1975), in 1975 USCAAN 1425, 1431.

19 In order to qualify for federal assistance, "[t]he State [must have] in effect a policy
that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education."

20 USC § 1412(1).
20 The mainstreaming provision reads: "[States must establish] procedures to assure
that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children... are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of handicapped children from the regular educational environment occurs only when the
nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of

supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 20 USC § 1412(5)(B).
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stream" them, in a system where many non-disabled students attend selective schools at the state's expense.
A.

The EAHCA's "Appropriate" Education Requirement

The Supreme Court has interpreted the "appropriate" education standard of the EAHCA so narrowly as to foreclose any argument that the statute requires states to provide the handicapped
with equal access to a choice program. In Hendrick Hudson Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v Rowley, 21 the Court held that appropriate education
consisted of "educational instruction specially designed to meet
the unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the instruction.

'22

Since even poor schools generally confer some benefit,

handicapped students cannot argue that their inability to attend
the best schools violates the "appropriate" education requirements
of the EAHCA.
In Rowley, the parents of an exceptionally bright deaf child
sought a school-sponsored sign language interpreter for their
daughter, so that she could achieve her full potential, commensurate with the opportunity afforded non-handicapped students. Although the lower courts ordered the accommodation,2" the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the standard for education of
the handicapped is merely that which confers "some educational
2
benefit" on the student. '
Rowley set out a two-part inquiry in determining whether an
education is "appropriate" for a given handicapped student:
(1) Does the state comply with the EAHCA's procedural
requirements?
(2) Has the state crafted a program for the student reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educa5
tional benefits?

2

The majority found that Congress's intent in passing the
EAHCA was not to provide equal opportunities for all students,
but rather to identify handicapped children and provide them with
access to a free public education.2 In reaching its conclusion, the
" 458 US 176 (1982).
Id at 188-89.

12

Rowley v Board of Educ, 483 F Supp 528 (S D NY 1980); Rowley v Board of Educ.
632 F2d 945 (2d Cir 1980).
24 Rowley, 458 US at 200.
" Id at 206-07.
s Id at 198-200.
"
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Court focused
education:

on the statutory

299

definition of "appropriate"

The term "free appropriate public education means special education and related services which (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of
the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity
with the individualized education program required
under Section 1414(a)(5) of this title. 7
The Court then analyzed the EAHCA's definitions of "special
education" and "related services," and found that "related services" means 'supportive services .... as may be required to assist
a handicapped child to benefit from special education.' ' 2 Thus the
Court found that the "benefit" language of section 1401(17) is "the
principal tool [provided by] Congress . .,. for parsing the critical
'2
phrase of the Act." 9
The Rowley Court found that the chief concern of the
EAHCA's sponsors was to provide access to public education without guaranteeing any particular standard of education. 0 The opinion notes that the EAHCA's legislators were influenced by Mills v
Board of Educ.3 1 and PARC v Pennsylvania,2s neither of which required any substantive level of service, but merely access to an adequate public education. s
Both Justice Blackmun's concurrence s ' and Justice White's
dissents define "appropriate" education differently from the majority. First, each argues that the statute specifies that state programs are to provide "full educational opportunity to all handi-

21 20 USC § 1401(18).
" Rowley, 458 US at 188, citing 20 USC § 1401(17).
'
Id.
" Id at 192. Although the Court does not specify a particular standard of education, it

does refer to the EAHCA's providing a "floor of opportunity" in education for the handicapped, perhaps suggesting more substance than this Comment argues. Id at 200. The Court
also states that schools which advance students from grade to grade are not necessarily
providing an appropriate education under the EAHCA. Id at 203 n 25.
01 348 F Supp 866.
"

334 F Supp 1257.
Rowley, 458 US at 193.
Id at 210 (Blackmun concurring).
Id at 213 (White dissenting). Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan

and Marshall.

300

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1991:

capped children." 6 They read this provision to imply that
"appropriate" requires not only mere benefit, but equal educational opportunities for handicapped and non-handicapped children. 7 Second, both the concurrence and dissent cite an EAHCA
Senate report which expresses congressional intent "to guarantee
that handicapped children are provided equal educational
opportunity.""
The Circuit Courts have not applied the Rowley standard uniformly. In Polk v Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit, the
Third Circuit interpreted Rowley's "benefit" language as affording
"more than a trivial amount of educational benefit. 8 s9 The court

found that physical therapy was an integral part of an "appropriate" education, as opposed to the services of a full-time interpreter
requested in Rowley. However, the District of Columbia Circuit
found in Knight by Knight v District of Columbia that placement
of a handicapped child in public school would provide the student
with "some educational benefit," and therefore the student's parents were not entitled to reimbursement for placing him in private
school, regardless of the comparative benefits of the private
school.'0 A handicapped student trying to gain access to a choice
program is comparable to the plaintiff in Knight, in that the student would need to show that the public school environment did
not offer educational benefits.
If Congress intended an equal educational opportunity for disabled students, uniform vouchers which result in disparate impact
on the handicapped are prohibited. Under the heightened standard
proposed by the Rowley dissent or perhaps by the Third Circuit in
Polk, a choice program would be unlawful if it denied handicapped
students an appropriate education by relegating them to the least
desirable schools through uniform vouchers. If a state offers students the opportunity to attend higher quality selective schools
with public funds, but denies that same opportunity to a handicapped student by providing a stipend that does not approach the

"

Id at 210 (Blackmun concurring) and at 213 (White dissenting, emphasis on "full"

deleted). Both cite 20 USC § 1412(2)(A).
" Rowley, 458 US at 211 (Blackmun concurring) and at 214-15 (White dissenting).
" Id at 210, 213 (Blackmun concurring; White dissenting) citing Education for An
Handicapped Children Act, S Rep No 168 at 9, 94th Cong, 1st Sess (June 2, 1975).
89853 F2d 171, 181 (3d Cir 1988).
40 877 F2d 1025, 1029-30 (DC Cir 1989). The court goes on to say that "there is simply

no evidence to support the proposition that [the child] will be unable to obtain educational
benefits in [a public school] environment, and the absence of such evidence is fatal to
[plaintiff's argument]." Id at 1030.
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cost of that student's education, the state has denied the handicapped student an equal educational opportunity.
However, under the standard adopted by the Rowley majority,
states need not provide equal educational opportunity to handicapped students. A handicapped student could only assert a claim
against a uniform voucher system if education in a non-participating school was of no benefit. Notwithstanding the existence of a
choice program, it would be difficult to argue that even the poorest
schools provide no educational benefit. Thus, Rowley probably
forecloses the "appropriate education" argument under the
EAHCA.
B. The EAHCA's "Mainstreaming" Requirement
Because the Rowley Court mentioned but failed to analyze the
mainstreaming provision of the EAHCA,41 the opinion does not indicate how the Court would apply the general "benefit" standard
to the EAHCA's direction to provide integrated schooling. The
lower courts have generally interpreted the mainstreaming provisions of the EAHCA with deference to the congressional preference
for integration, but are cautious about imposing an undue financial
burden on local school districts. Some courts require mainstreaming except where it would cause extreme hardship to the local
school district or other students.42
The Ninth Circuit has found that mainstreaming is fundamental to the purpose of the EAHCA. 3 Conversely, the Eighth Circuit
has held that a school district is not required to place a handicapped child in an integrated setting, as long as the requirements
for placement in a public program are met. 4 A calibrated tuition
voucher proposal might be a solution for a court adopting the
stricter standard. Other courts, applying the lower standard, might
not require states to accommodate the disabled in their choice
plans. However, if these same courts apply the lower standard
largely out of concern for district finances, they might accept a calibrated system, if calibration does not impose additional costs
upon the district.
Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Educ. v Rowley, 458 US 176, 202-03 (1982).
" See, for example, Roncker v Walter, 700 F2d 1058 (6th Cir 1983). See also A. W. v
Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F2d 158 (8th Cir 1987).
43 Department of Educ. v Katherine D., 727 F2d 809, 817 (9th Cir 1983) ("Although
the statute does not require 'mainstreaming' in every case, it is fundamental to the scheme
and purpose of the Act that handicapped children be provided the same educational opportunity and exposure as those children who are not so disadvantaged.").
4 Mark A. v Grant Wood Area Educ. Agency, 795 F2d 52, 54 (8th Cir 1986).
41
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The strongest approach to the EAHCA's mainstreaming requirement, that taken by the Sixth Circuit, requires services to be
provided in an integrated environment wherever feasible. 5 The
court in Roncker v Walter recognized that the EAHCA allows exceptions to its general requirement of integration "only when the
nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular
classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.' 4 The court identified a strong congressional preference for integration,' 7 and proposed that the state incorporate separate but superior services into an integrated setting
wherever feasible.48 By requiring integration in such strong terms,
the Sixth Circuit sought to balance Congress's strong preference
for integration with the reality that some handicapped students either would not benefit from a mainstream classroom or would unduly disrupt a mainstream classroom."" The court cited cost as a
proper factor to balance in the analysis, but stated that cost is no
defense for a district which has failed "to provide a proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children. 50 Thus,
the Sixth Circuit's standard for the EAHCA mainstreaming provision is far more demanding than the Rowley Court's application of
the EAHCA's "appropriate" education requirement.
The Eighth Circuit in A. W. v Northwest R-1 School Dist.5 1
accepted the Roncker analysis but nonetheless found that a severely mentally retarded boy belonged in a segregated institution.
The A. W. decision is based on deference to local government's allocation of limited economic resources.5 2 The court commented
that to have held for plaintiff would have "tie[d] the hands of local
and state educational authorities who must balance the reality of
limited public funds against the exceptional needs of handicapped
children."5 3 So even under the most stringent test for implementing the EAHCA, one court has held that mainstreaming is not re-

41Roncker, 700

F2d 1058.
" Id at 1060, citing 20 USC § 1412(5)(B).
47 Id at 1063.
" "In a case where the segregated facility is considered superior, the court should determine whether the services which make that placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would
be inappropriate under the Act." Id.
49 Roncker, 700 F2d at 1063.
60 Id.
81 813 F2d 158 (8th Cir 1987).
52 Id at 164.
" Id.
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quired where cost considerations drive the school district's decision
to place handicapped children in separate facilities.
An earlier Eighth Circuit decision had held that the school
district was not required to place a handicapped child in an integrated setting where the segregated setting complied with the requirements for placement in a public program.5 4 Thus, the courts'
willingness to enforce the mandate of the EAHCA mainstreaming
provision is mixed.
If cost concerns drive the courts' decisions to interpret the
mainstreaming provision narrowly, then the courts might accept
calibrated vouchers as a reasonable accommodation. Because states
already provide higher average funding to handicapped students,
vouchers and credits can be calibrated to acknowledge the needs of
the disabled without extra cost to the state. Courts need not defer
to a uniform voucher program out of fear that enforcing the
EAHCA would burden local school districts.
III. THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197311 prohibits discrimination
against the handicapped by recipients of federal money.5 6 The
statute prohibits discrimination in public programs, including edu57
cational agencies.
A.

School Choice Exception to the Smith Rule

Although the Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination by
educational agencies, the Supreme Court in Smith v Robinson"8 severely restricted a plaintiff's ability to sue under the Rehabilitation
Act where the EAHCA provides a cause of action. 59 However, the
Smith decision does not apply to programs that provide benefits in
addition to those guaranteed under the EAHCA.6 0 Because a
voucher program would exceed the minimal requirements imposed
by the EAHCA, such programs remain susceptible to Rehabilitation Act challenges.

" Mark A., 795 F2d at 54.
- 29 USC §§ 701-796 (1982).
- 29 USC § 794.
" 29 USCA § 794(b)(2)(B) (Supp 1990).

" 468 US 992 (1984).
Note that the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 codifies the holding in
Smith. 20 USC §1415(f) (1988).
1* 468 US at 1019 n 22.
59
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In Smith the Court held that where a suit is filed under both
the EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act, plaintiffs must exhaust
EAHCA grievance procedures before pursuing other statutory remedies.6 Since the EAHCA is more specific to causes of action in
education, the Court foreclosed broader discrimination protections
in cases which could be brought under the EAHCA.62 Some commentators decried the Court's limitation, especially given the narrow interpretation of the EAHCA in Rowley. e Rowley limits the
EAHCA's "appropriate" education requirement to education which
offers some benefit, and Smith limits a handicapped student's
causes of action to those under the EAHCA.
However, the Court did enumerate some exceptions to the
Smith rule, and suggested that the Rehabilitation Act would be
available where a state denied services to a handicapped child in a
program which went beyond the requirements of the EAHCA. 4 As
discussed above, a choice program goes beyond the scope of
EAHCA requirements, and thus would probably fall outside the
Smith rule. If the state denied handicapped students access to a
choice program, the Rehabilitation Act would provide redress.
B. Disparate Impact Test
If the Rehabilitation Act provides a cause of action for discrimination in choice programs, and the discrimination is assessed
under a disparate impact test, uniform voucher programs violate
the Rehabilitation Act. The disparate impact, or "effects", test
finds liability if disparate impact is shown, while the intent test
requires a showing that there was an intent to discriminate by the
state. The disparate impact standard is useful in cases, like disability, where discrimination is more often the product of neglect
rather than malice. Guided by the factors analyzed in Alexander v
Choate,"e a disparate impact standard imposes liability whenever
01Id at 992.
62 The Court held that where the Rehabilitation Act did not expand the substantive
rights of the handicapped child, and where the EAHCA provided a more precise remedy,
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was unavailable. Id at 1021. Section 504 is codified at 29
USC § 794, the primary discrimination prohibition in the Rehabilitation Act.
" See Robert J. Goodwin, Public School Integration of Children With Handicaps After Smith v Robinson: "Separate But Equal" Revisited?, 37 Me L Rev 267, 277-79 (1985).
" The Court commented, "[o]f course, if a State provided services beyond those required by the [EAHCA], but discriminatorily denied those services to a handicapped child,
§ 504 would remain available to the child as an avenue of relief." Smith, 468 US at 1019
n 22.
" 469 US 287 (1985).
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public education programs effectively exclude the handicapped.
Thus, uniform voucher systems which result in low-level participation by handicapped students are illegal.
The Court in Choate held that with regard to a state Medicaid
program's disparate impact on the handicapped, the standard for
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act falls somewhere between "intent" and "effects." 6 Faced with rocketing Medicaid
costs, Tennessee had proposed. reducing from twenty to fourteen
the number of annual days of inpatient hospital care covered by
the state Medicaid program.2 Respondents, Medicaid recipients,
alleged that the limitation would have a discriminatory effect on
handicapped hospital users, who required more than fourteen days
of hospitalization at three and a half times the rate of non-handicapped users. 8 The Court rejected a strictly intent-based test, because, if applied in every case, such a narrow test would defeat the
purpose of section 504's anti-discrimination provisions.6 9 Because
discrimination against the handicapped is more often the product
of neglect than animosity, an intent test would not reach much of
the conduct that Congress sought to proscribe.°
However, the Court argued that not all state conduct with discriminatory effects on the handicapped would violate section 504.
A requirement that states evaluate the impact on the handicapped
of every action affecting them would be administratively burdensome.7 1 Section 504 prohibits disparate impact when "an otherwise
qualified handicapped individual [has not been] provided with
'7
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers."
In defining "meaningful access," the Court analyzed four factors to determine whether a program's disparate impact on the
handicapped would violate the Rehabilitation Act. The Court implied that a disparate impact test would be appropriate where:
(1) the handicapped were excluded from or denied meaningful access to a public program;
(2) the handicapped did not receive the benefit promised
by the program;

u Id at 299.
' Id at 289.
Id at 289-90.
Choate, 469 US at 296-97.
70 Id at 295-97.
71 Id at 298.
" Id at 301, citing Southeastern Community College v Davis, 442 US 397 (1979).
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(3) the federal statutory plan indicated that Congress
would favor requiring meaningful access to the handicapped over allowing state discretion in deciding what
level of access to provide; and
(4) the cost of a disparate impact or effects test would
not be unduly burdensome to the state.73
Applying these factors to the reduction of Medicaid benefits in
Choate, the Court found that all four factors favored the state.
First, the limitation did not exclude the handicapped from Tennessee Medicaid services nor deny them meaningful access to the
program .7 Not only was the limitation neutral on its face, but the
handicapped, like the non-handicapped, would benefit from coverage they received under the fourteen-day rule.7 5 Second, since Congress merely guaranteed that Medicaid recipients would receive
some package of health care benefits, but did not seek to provide a
particular level of health care, the handicapped received the promised benefit of the Medicaid program.7 6 In supporting this argument, the Court cited regulations promulgated under section 504
77
which mandate equal opportunity as opposed to equal benefit.
Third, the Court found that the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act did not limit the discretion of states in devising Medicaid programs. 78 Thus Congress did not intend the discrimination
prohibition of section 504 to limit a state's ability to construct a
package of Medicaid services. 79 However, the Court explicitly distinguished educational programs from Medicaid in this part of its
holding, commenting that denying meaningful access to education
would be particularly burdensome to the handicapped.8 0 The last
argument the Court proffered for allowing Tennessee's inpatient
Choate, 469 US at 302-09.
" Id at 302.
"' Id at 302 n 22.
71 Id at 303, citing 42 USC § 1396(a)(19).
" The Court quoted the regulations as stipulating that, "aids, benefits, and services, to
be equally effective, are not required to produce the identical result or level of achievement
for handicapped and non-handicapped persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal
opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of
achievement." Choate, 469 US at 305, citing 45 CFR § 84.4(b)(ii) (1984).
78

71

Id at 307.

79 Id.
80 The Court suggested that, "[iun enacting the Rehabilitation Act and in subsequent
amendments, Congress did focus on several substantive areas-employment, ed'ication, and
the elimination of physical barriers to access-in which it considered the societal and personal costs of refusals to provide meaningful access to the handicapped to be particularly
high. But nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of § 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads on the States' longstanding discretion to choose the
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care limitation to stand under section 504 was administrative cost
to the state.8 ' The Court envisioned that an analysis of disparate
impact on the handicapped, broken down by class of handicap, for
every action affecting Medicaid recipients, would be "well beyond"
the accommodation required under earlier interpretations of the
statute.2

However, in a case challenging disparate impact in a school
choice program, the Choate analysis reaches a result in favor of a
handicapped plaintiff. First, a choice program is an all or nothing
proposition, where offering some handicapped students an inadequate tuition credit denies them meaningful access to the program.
While Choate's handicapped Medicaid beneficiaries received fourteen covered hospital days even if they required a longer stay,
handicapped students holding a voucher insufficient to cover the
costs of their education would not be accepted at all. Second, the
benefit of a choice program is to provide a better education to students through competitive schools. But uniform vouchers may
deny that better education to handicapped students because they
would attend schools that did not participate in the competitive
system. Third, the Choate Court distinguished education as a substantive area for which Congress favors ensuring equal opportunity
over state discretion. 8 Fourth, cost concerns are irrelevant here, as
the proposed calibrated voucher system would merely re-route
money which has already been allocated. Thus, all four Choate factors indicate that the disparate impact on the handicapped of a
uniform voucher program would violate section 504. A low level of
meaningful participation by handicapped students in a choice program would be evidence of discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act.
Regardless of the favorable dicta in Smith and Choate, the
Court's holdings limit the reach of the Rehabilitation Act from
providing relief to handicapped students excluded from uniform
voucher programs. The Americans With Disabilities Act, 4 enacted.
proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on services covered by State Medi-

caid." Id at 306-07 (footnotes and citations omitted).
81 Alexander v Choate, 469 US 287, 308 (1985).
8, Id.

80 Equal opportunity in education has been the law since Brown v Board of Educ.: "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." 347 US

483, 493 (1954).
8 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990).
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six years after Smith, is arguably Congress's attempt to strengthen
federal equal opportunity protection for the handicapped.
IV. THE

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES

ACT OF 1990

The ADA, enacted in July 1990, prohibits discrimination
against the disabled by a broad range of entities, including government programs and services, private employers, and private businesses serving the public. The ADA protects any "qualified individual with a disability," defined as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities
provided by the public entity."8 5 The ADA was enacted in order to
protect the disabled in areas not covered under earlier laws.86 Specifically, Congress intended the ADA to expand the protections
guaranteed by the Rehabilitation Act, 87 which prohibited only recipients of federal money from discriminating against the
disabled. 8
The ADA prohibits public entities from excluding the handicapped from participating in government programs or denying program benefits to the handicapped.89 Section 202 of the ADA closely
follows the language of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The
statute defines "public entity" as "(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and
(C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority."9 0 In sum, the ADA broadly prohibits the exclu" Id at § 201(2).
"

Attorney General Thornburgh testified that, "[o]ne of the [ADA's] most impressive

strengths is its comprehensive character. Over the last 20 years, civil rights laws protecting
disabled persons have been enacted in piecemeal fashion. Thus, existing Federal laws are
like a patchwork quilt in need of repair. There are holes in the fabric, serious gaps in coverage that leave persons with disabilities without adequate civil rights protections." Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-485 part 2, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 48 (May 15,
1990), citing Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Hearings on HR2273 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on Education and Labor,
101st Cong, 2d Sess 812 (1989).
e Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 47-48.
29 USC § 794 (1982).
89 Pub L No 101-336 § 202.
o0 Id at § 201(1). It is important to note that the Rehabilitation Act included in its

definition of programs covered: "a local educational agency (as defined in § 2891(12) of Title
20) system of vocational education, or other school system." 29 USC § 794(b)(2)(B). Although these words do not appear in § 201 of the ADA, Congress never acknowledged the

difference. Instead, Congress chose a broad definition of public entity, which seems to in-
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sion of and denial of benefits to the handicapped by state
programs.
A. The Smith Rule's Effect on the ADA
The Smith rule, limiting causes of action where plaintiffs may
sue under the EAHCA, should not apply to the ADA, because Congress enacted the ADA without mentioning Smith while indicating
an intent for the handicapped to have recourse to all remedies.
Arguably, if the ADA only expands the number of parties covered and not the substantive rights guaranteed by the Rehabilitation Act, Smith would prevent the handicapped from suing under
the ADA where the EAHCA provides a cause of action. The reasoning in Smith that Congress would have intended handicapped
students to avail themselves of the more specific remedies of the
EAHCA would seem to apply to the ADA as well as to the Rehabilitation Act."' Perhaps Congress enacted the ADA with knowledge that Smith limited the Rehabilitation Act, and since Congress
did not explicitly reject the reasoning of Smith, the ADA might
also be limited.
However, nothing in the ADA's legislative history refers either
to Smith or to an intent to foreclose the ADA with respect to education programs. Indeed, if the general purpose of the ADA is to
expand the protections of previously enacted laws,92 such an interpretation would be inconsistent with that purpose.93 Furthermore,
the ADA, as the most recently enacted law, should supersede earlier statutes and judicial constructions. Since Congress intended to
expand the protections of the handicapped, and was silent on the
question of Smith's application to the ADA, we may reasonably
clude education agencies, without expressly naming them. Furthermore, the ADA seems implicitly to apply to education programs, since among the findings and purposes of the Act is

the statement that discrimination exists in the "critical area" of education. Pub L No 101336 § 2(a)(3). Moreover, another section, which explicitly amends the Rehabilitation Act,
refers to standards applicable to education programs. See id at § 512(a)(C)(iv), ("[L]ocal

educational agencies may take disciplinary action pertaining to the use or possession of illegal drugs or alcohol . . . to the same extent that such disciplinary action is taken against
nonhandicapped students.").
1 See Smith v Robinson, 468 US 992, 1019-20 (1984).

9' See H Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 50 (cited in note 86).
" The ADA expressly provides that it does not "invalidate or limit the remedies, rights,
and procedures" of any Federal, State, or local law which might provide greater or equal
protection for the disabled. Pub L No 101-336 § 501(b). While this protection does not
speak to the EAHCA's potential limitation on the ADA, the section's legislative history con-

veys a congressional intent that the handicapped have recourse to all available remedies.
See H Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 135 (cited in note 86); Americans With Disabilities Act of

1990, H Rep No 101-485 part 3, 101st Cong, 2d Seas 69-70 (May 15, 1990).
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disregard Smith in order to achieve Congress's purpose and allow
the ADA its full vigor.
Moreover, even were Smith to limit suits brought under the
ADA, Smith's dicta would still retain causes of action against programs outside the EAHCA mandate: a school district that discriminated against the handicapped in its choice program would be
subject to the discrimination provision of the ADA.
B.

Congress's Preference for a Disparate Impact Test

Since the ADA was enacted so recently, and section 202 does
not take effect until January 1992,1" the courts have not yet ruled
on whether an "intent" or "effects" test will be used to identity
discrimination under the law. Although the ADA's legislative history does not set a clear standard, it suggests a preference for a
disparate impact or effects test. Under an effects test, a uniform
voucher program's disparate impact on the handicapped would
constitute discrimination under Title II of the ADA.
The legislative history of the ADA suggests that courts should
scrutinize discriminatory effects on the handicapped at least as
closely under the ADA as under the Rehabilitation Act.95 The Education and Labor Committee tried to offer a clear standard by
which to review Title II discrimination, declaring, "it is . . . the
Committee's intent that section 202 also be interpreted consistent
with Alexander v Choate."9' 6 The Committee understood Choate to
mandate a disparate impact standard.9 7 However, the standard in

Pub L No 101-336 § 205(a).
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-485 part 1, 101st Cong, 2d
Sess (May 14, 1990) (Committee on Public Works and Transportation); Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-485 part 2, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (May 15, 1990)
(Committee on Education and Labor); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No
101-485 part 3, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (May 15, 1990) (Committee on the Judiciary); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-485, part 4, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (May 15,
1990) (Committee on Energy and Commerce); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H
Rep No 101-558, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (June 26, 1990) (Conference Report); Americans With
Disabilities Act of 1990, H Rep No 101-596, 101st Cong, 2d Sess (July 12, 1990) (Conference
Report).
" H Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 84 (Committee on Education and Labor).
" The Report explains in a section dealing with employment discrimination that,
"[t]he Court in Choate explained that members of Congress made numerous statements
during passage of section 504 regarding eliminating architectural barriers, providing access
to transportation, and eliminating discriminatory effects of job qualification procedures. The
Court then noted: 'These statements would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not
rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminates by effect as well as by design.'" H
Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 61 (Committee on Education and Labor).
"
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Choate is not as clear as the Committee asserted."8
The House Committee on the Judiciary also commented extensively on the standards Congress expected courts to apply to
discrimination in public programs. The Judiciary Committee argued first that integration of the handicapped may require shortterm burdens for the sake of long-term gains.9 9
The Judiciary Committee also focused on the importance of
non-segregated services. Neither convenience nor cost was a valid
justification for offering only separate services under the ADA,
even if the separate services were equal to or better than integrated services. 100 Congress permitted such services to exist, but
they were not to be "used as a basis to exclude a person with a
disability from a program that [was] offered to persons without
disabilities, or to refuse to provide an accommodation in a regular
setting." 10 The Judiciary Committee also pointed out that the
public services title of the ADA requires "reasonable accommodation" for the handicapped that does not impose "undue hardship"
on the entity making the accommodation or fundamentally alter
the program.0 2 The Committee envisioned that the standard of
hardship would vary from case to case, depending on all available
resources, and the entity claiming undue hardship would have the
burden of proof. 0 3
Note also that in discussing the ADA's effect on the insurance industry, the Committee on Education and Labor Report reverses its earlier interpretation of Choate, saying "as
is stated by the U.S. Supreme [C]ourt, in Alexander v Choate, 469 US 287 (1985), employee
benefit plans should not be found to be in violation of this legislation under impact analysis
simply because they do not address the special needs of every person with a disability, e.g.,
additional sick leave or medical coverage." H Rep No 101-485 part 2 at 137 (Committee on
Education and Labor). The best explanation for the Committee's seeming self-contradiction
may be that the Committee understood Choate's holding as limited to medical disabilities.
This construction is consistent with the construction advanced here. See text accompanying
notes 71-80.
H Rep No 101-485 part 3 at 50 and n 50 (Committee on the Judiciary), citing Dopico
v Goldshmidt, 687 F2d 644, 650 (2d Cir 1982) and New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens
V New Mexico, 678 F2d 847, 855 (10th Cir 1982), for the proposition that substantial burdens may be placed on state and local agencies "in order to accomplish the Rehabilitation
Act's goals of nondiscrimination and integration."
o H Rep No 101-485, part 3 at 50 (Committee on the Judiciary) (cited in note 95).
101Id, summarizing 45 CFR § 84.4(b)(3) (1985).
101Id at 51.
1* The Judiciary Committee specified that providing readers to blind case workers, interpreters for the deaf, or equipping telephones for the hearing impaired would constitute
reasonable accommodations, depending on the size and budget of the employer. Id at 51,
citing 42 Fed Reg 22688 (May 4, 1977). Since these are potentially expensive alternatives,
the cheap accommodation suggested by this Comment seems clearly within the "reasonable"
parameter set by the statute.
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These comments by congressional committees suggest that the
ADA may require a voucher system to calibrate its vouchers to the
costs of educating handicapped students. Calibrated vouchers do
not impose an undue hardship on the state, since they cost the
state no more than the current system of financing education for
handicapped children.10 ' In fact, if some selective schools are able
to educate handicapped students for less than public schools currently spend, the net cost to society of educating the handicapped
might decrease under a calibrated voucher system.1 0 5 Moreover,
the calibrated voucher system would promote integrated education. Even if implementation of the proposed system were to increase administrative costs initially, the Judiciary Committee considered such short-term burdens as necessary to achieving the
ADA's long-term goals. Thus the calibrated voucher proposal is
consistent with, if not required by, the standards imposed by two
ADA congressional committee reports. Conversely, uniform vouchers would subvert the purposes of the ADA by effectively excluding
the handicapped.
CONCLUSION

Handicapped students challenging uniform voucher choice
programs may have three avenues of statutory redress, despite the
Supreme Court's apparent preference for construing such statutes
narrowly. The Court has interpreted the requirement for "appropriate" education under the EAHCA too narrowly for the statute
to provide relief in this case; since handicapped students almost
inevitably receive "some educational benefit" from public school
programs, they cannot argue after Rowley that the state has denied
them an appropriate education. Handicapped students might argue more successfully, however, that uniform vouchers will result
in their being excluded from the mainstream.
Handicapped students might also seek relief under the Rehabilitation Act. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Rehabilitation Act is generally not available where the EAHCA provides redress, choice programs seem to fall within an exception to
the Smith rule. Under the Choate disparate impact standard,
I0 See text accompanying notes 6-14.
108 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose 159, (Harcourt Brace Jova-

novich, 1980) and Saves, Privatizing the Public Sector at 102-03, (cited in note 2), argue
that privately-run schools educate students at an average lower cost than public schools. Of
course, if private schools educate more cheaply than public schools, then costs would decrease under a uniform voucher system as well.
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handicapped students are impermissibly discriminated against if
they are unable to participate in the choice program to the same
extent as the non-handicapped.
Handicapped students probably have a cause of action under
the ADA. Because the ADA extends the protections made available
under the Rehabilitation Act, arguments under the ADA resemble
those under the Rehabilitation Act. However, the ADA provides
greater protection than the Rehabilitation Act, and will likely be
interpreted to require increased accommodation of the
handicapped.
In a system where schools select students holding uniform
vouchers, selective schools will naturally avoid students whose education costs exceed their voucher remittance. Because disabled students are more expensive to educate, selective schools will reject
them. The ADA bars uniform voucher systems because they effectively deny handicapped students the benefits of a publicly-financed program.
Calibrating vouchers to the costs of educating students is one
way of bringing choice programs into compliance with federal law.
Though states might also comply, for example, by incorporating
random selection of students into the choice program, this solution
eliminates one of the competitive elements of the choice program
and imposes perhaps unforeseen costs on the schools. Calibration
ensures schools enough funds to educate all of their students while
preserving crucial elements of competition and integration.

